THE ENIGMA OF ESMAIL QAANI: LEADERSHIP, SURVIVAL, AND THE SHADOWS OF ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE
A cloud of mystery has surrounded Esmail Qaani for months
General Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, has emerged as an important figure in the complex geopolitical landscape of the Middle East since assuming command following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020.
His leadership has been marked by a series of strategic setbacks for Iran and its allies, including the elimination of key leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as devastating attacks in Beirut and Tehran. These events have led to speculation about his competence, loyalty, and, most intriguingly, a possible relationship with Israeli intelligence.
Esmail Qaani was born on August 8, 1957, in Mashhad, one of the holy cities in northeastern Iran. Coming from a religious family, Qaani joined the IRGC in 1980, shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in the context of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). During this conflict, which shaped an entire generation of Iranian commanders, Qaani distinguished himself as the leader of the 5th Nasr Brigade and the 21st Imam Reza Brigade, key units in defensive and offensive operations against Iraq. His battlefield experience brought him close to Qasem Soleimani, who was already emerging as a charismatic figure within the IRGC.
Qaani quickly rose through the IRGC ranks, demonstrating organizational and logistical skills. In 1997, Soleimani, then commander of the Quds Force, appointed him his second-in-command. The Quds Force, an elite unit tasked with extraterritorial operations, is responsible for coordinating and financing allied groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza, forming what Iran calls the "Axis of Resistance". As deputy commander, Qaani oversaw financial and logistical operations, traveling frequently to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to strengthen Iranian proxy networks.
On January 3, 2020, Qasem Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in Baghdad, ordered by President Donald Trump. This event marked a turning point for Iran and its power projection in the region. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed Qaani as Soleimani's successor the same day, highlighting his experience and loyalty to the regime. However, Qaani inherited a position of enormous responsibility at a time of growing external pressure, with Israel intensifying its "shadow war" against Iran and its allies.
Unlike Soleimani, known for his charisma, personal relationships with militia leaders, and an almost mythical public presence, Qaani has adopted a more discreet profile. His approach has focused on operational management, avoiding media exposure. This difference in style has drawn criticism within Iran, where some analysts and IRGC officials believe Qaani lacks the strategic leadership of his predecessor. Nevertheless, he has maintained the structure of the “Axis of Resistance”, albeit with mixed results due to the blows suffered by Hezbollah and Hamas in 2024 and 2025.
Rumors of a relationship with Israeli Intelligence
Speculation about Qaani's possible collaboration with Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence service, surfaced in October 2024, following a series of Israeli airstrikes in Beirut that decimated Hezbollah's leadership.
On September 27, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, was killed in a bombing in the Dahieh neighborhood of southern Beirut. Days later, on October 3, another attack killed Hashem Safieddine, Nasrallah's presumed successor, and Iranian General Abbas Nilforoushan, a senior Quds Force officer.
Qaani traveled to Lebanon on September 29 to assess the situation following Nasrallah's death, but was surprisingly absent from a key meeting of Hezbollah's Shura Council, allowing him to survive the second attack.
Qaani's absence from subsequent public events, including a prayer led by Khamenei in Tehran on October 4, 2024, sparked rumors about his whereabouts. Various Middle Eastern media reported that Qaani was in custody, being interrogated for possible security lapses that allowed Israel to carry out such targeted operations. Some sources even claimed that Qaani suffered a heart attack during interrogation, fueling conspiracy theories about his loyalty.
Speculation took a more extreme tone, with unverified publications claiming in April 2025 that Qaani was a Mossad spy and had provided key information for the assassinations of Nasrallah, Safieddine, and Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas political leader, who was assassinated in Tehran on July 31, 2024. Another subsequent, rapidly viral news story from June 2025 suggested that Qaani was "safe in Israel."
The idea that Qaani is a Mossad asset is, in principle, highly unlikely, but not impossible in the context of the covert war between Israel and Iran. The Mossad has a long history of infiltrating Iranian security structures. The assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, the sabotage at the Natanz nuclear facility in 2020 and 2021, and the operation in Lebanon in 2024, where manipulated electronic devices (such as pagers and walkie-talkies) killed dozens of Hezbollah operatives, demonstrate Israel's ability to penetrate high-level security networks.
Several reasons suggest that the accusations against Qaani are more speculative than factual:
Lack of direct evidence: There are no credible documents, recordings, or testimonies linking Qaani to the Mossad. The claims in some Arab media lack verifiable sources and could be part of a disinformation campaign. Israeli psychological campaign: Iranian analysts argue that the rumors about Qaani are part of a Mossad psychological operation to generate distrust in the IRGC and Iranian society. These campaigns seek to destabilize Iran internally, gather information on Qaani's whereabouts, and prepare the ground for a possible assassination.
Alternative security lapses: Setbacks under Qaani's leadership, such as the killings of Nasrallah, Haniyeh, and Safieddine, could be explained by Israel's technological and intelligence superiority. The attacks in Lebanon in 2024 using electronic devices suggest a technological breach rather than internal betrayal. Likewise, the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran, attributed to an explosive device planted in an IRGC guesthouse, points to physical or electronic infiltration, not necessarily a high-level mole like Qaani.
Internal motivations in Iran: Some analysts suggest that suspicions about Qaani could stem from internal rivalries within the IRGC. Officials dissatisfied with his leadership may be fueling rumors to weaken his position, especially after the failures in Lebanon and Gaza.
Despite these considerations, the possibility that Qaani is an Israeli asset cannot be completely ruled out. The history of espionage is full of unlikely cases, such as that of Ashraf Marwan, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's son-in-law, who worked for the Mossad in the 1970s. However, the lack of concrete evidence and the context of psychological warfare suggest that the rumors are, for now, purely speculative.
Qaani has been targeted by Israel in at least three major series of attacks, the Beirut bombings in September and October 2024, and the Operation Rampant Lion (I like it better than rising or nascent) attacks in Tehran in June 2025. And in all of them he has escaped death, and in the latest one, not only has he escaped death, he is the only senior Iranian military commander, except for Supreme Leader Khamenei, who has escaped death.
Iran's military hierarchy before the June 2025 attacks: all eliminated except Khamenei and Qaani.
This man is either very lucky, or has privileged information that allows him to avoid Israeli attacks, or Israel truly does not want to kill him.
Using a probabilistic model based on factors such as the accuracy of the attacks, Qaani's mobility, and the security measures at his disposal, the probabilities of survival can be calculated in each case.
As I mentioned above, following the assassination of Hasan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024, in an Israeli airstrike in the Dahieh neighborhood, Qaani traveled to Beirut on September 29 to meet with Hezbollah leaders and assess the situation. On October 3, Israel launched another massive attack in the same neighborhood, killing Hashem Safieddine and Abbas Nilforoushan. Qaani, invited to a Hezbollah Shura Council meeting, did not attend, allowing him to survive.
Considering:
The accuracy of the attacks: The Israeli bombings in Dahieh used high-precision guided bombs, such as 2,000-pound JDAMs, capable of destroying underground bunkers. The probability of survival in a direct attack is estimated at 10–20%, depending on the level of protection (Hezbollah bunkers offer some resistance, but are not infallible).
Qaani's absence: His decision not to attend the Shura Council meeting significantly reduces his exposure. If the meeting was the primary target, the probability that Qaani was present is estimated at 50%, based on information about his itinerary and the lack of confirmation of his presence at the site.
Prior intelligence: If Qaani had prior knowledge of the attack (from Iranian intelligence or leaks), his likelihood of avoiding the site increases. However, there is no concrete evidence of this, so a neutral probability (50%) is assumed for this factor.
Mobility and security: As commander of the Quds Force, Qaani operates with a high level of secrecy, frequently changing locations and using armed escorts. This increases his likelihood of avoiding direct targeting.
The probability of surviving the attack in Beirut can be calculated as:
P(survive)=P(not being there)+P(being there)⋅P(survive the attack)
Assuming:
P(not being there)= 0.5 P(not being there)=0.5
P(being there)=0.1 P (being there)=0.1
P(survive the attack)= 0.15 P (survive the attack) = 0.15
Then:
P(survive) = 0.5 + (0.1 ⋅ 0.15) = 0.5 + 0.015 = 0.515 or 51.5%
If we incorporate the possibility of prior intelligence (50% chance of avoiding the location), the adjusted probability is:
P(not being at the location) = 0.515 ⋅ 0.5 + 0.515 ⋅ 0.5 = 0.515
P(survive) = 0.515 + (0.05 ⋅ 0.15) = 0.515 + 0.0075 = 0.5225 or 52.25%
Therefore Therefore, the probability that Qaani survived the Beirut attack is between 51.5% and 52.25%, depending on the weight assigned to prior intelligence.
Separately, in June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rampant Lion, a massive attack on nuclear and military facilities in Iran. The bombings killed key figures such as IRGC commander Hossein Salami, Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, and several nuclear scientists. Initial sources claimed that Qaani was dead, but a video released on June 24, 2025, showed him alive at a demonstration in Tehran, contradicting these claims.
Images of a person purportedly Esmail Qaani alive published on June 24, 2025 at a demonstration in Tehran
Considering:
The scope of the attacks: The bombings in Tehran affected multiple targets, including IRGC headquarters, nuclear facilities, and residential areas. The probability of survival in a direct attack on a headquarters is low (10-20%), but Qaani was apparently not among the primary targets, such as the Salami barracks.
Qaani's mobility: As leader of the Quds Force, Qaani operates with high mobility and advanced security measures, such as armored vehicles and frequent changes of location. The probability that he was not at an attacked location is estimated at 80-90%.
Personal protection: Qaani has an elite security detail, which increases his probability of surviving an indirect attack (estimated at 50%).
Iranian intelligence: Following the 2024 attacks, Iran strengthened its security measures, which may have allowed Qaani to avoid key targets. However, the effectiveness of these measures is limited compared to Israeli precision.
Assuming:
P(not being there) = 0.85 P(\text{not being there}) = 0.85 P(not being there) = 0.85
P(being there) = 0.15 P(being there) = 0.15
P(surviving the attack) = 0.5 P(surviving the attack) = 0.5
Then:
P(surviving) = 0.85 + (0.15⋅0.5) = 0.85 + 0.075 = 0.925 or 92.5%
If we assume a 50% probability that Qaani had prior intelligence, the adjusted probability is:
P(not being there) = 0.85⋅0.5 + 0.85⋅0.5 = 0.925 P
P(survive) = 0.925 + (0.075⋅0.5) = 0.925 + 0.0375 = 0.9625 or 96.25%
Therefore, the probability that Qaani survived the attack in Tehran is between 92.5% and 96.25%.
Combined Probability
To calculate the probability that Qaani survived both events (Beirut and Tehran), we assume they are independent events:
P(both events) = P(Beirut) ⋅ P(Tehran)
Using the most conservative values:
P(both events) = 0.515 ⋅ 0.925 = 0.476375 or 47.64%
Using the values adjusted by prior intelligence:
P(both events) = 0.525 ⋅ 0.9625 = 0.5053 or 50.53%
Therefore, the probability that Qaani survived both attacks is between 47.64% and 50.53%.
This probability is very low, yet he is still alive.
Even considering his position, mobility, and security measures, as well as other factors such as his absence from key meetings and his operational experience, which likely played a crucial role in his survival, the combined probability of surviving all these attacks is very low.
Was Soleimani's assassination a move to facilitate Qaani's rise?
Qasem Soleimani was killed on January 3, 2020, in a US drone strike at Baghdad airport. The attack, authorized by President Trump, was justified by the US as a response to the growing threat from pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, led by Soleimani. Israel, a close US ally, likely provided intelligence for the operation, given its interest in neutralizing the architect of the “Axis of Resistance”.
Soleimani was a unique, charismatic figure with personal relationships with leaders like Nasrallah and a knack for coordinating complex operations across multiple countries. His death left a void in the IRGC, and the choice of Qaani as his successor surprised some observers, given his lower profile and technical focus.
It is clear that Israel had a strong interest in eliminating Soleimani, given his role in strengthening Hezbollah, Hamas, and other anti-Israel militias. However, the theory that his assassination was designed to facilitate Qaani's rise as an Israeli asset raises several questions:
Differences between Soleimani and Qaani: Soleimani was a strategic leader with a network of personal connections that amplified Iran's influence. Qaani, on the other hand, is seen as a competent but less charismatic administrator. If Israel was looking for a weaker leader for the Quds Force, Qaani might have been a logical choice, but there is no evidence (which does not mean it is untrue) that Israel had control over his appointment, which was Khamenei's direct decision.
US-Israel Collaboration: The attack on Soleimani was carried out by the US, but Israeli intelligence likely played a key role. If Qaani were a Mossad asset, his rise could have been a secondary objective, but this would require an extremely deep infiltration into the IRGC, something that, while possible, is difficult to sustain without proof (if so, it will never exist).
Setbacks under Qaani: Security failures during Qaani's tenure, such as the assassinations of Nasrallah, Haniyeh, and Safieddine, have weakened Iran's allies. This could be interpreted as evidence of strategic weakness that benefits Israel, but it could also reflect the operational superiority of the Mossad, which has previously demonstrated its ability to execute precise attacks without the need for a high-level mole.
The probability that Soleimani's assassination was a move solely to establish Qaani as an Israeli asset is low, probably less than 5%, due to:
The lack of direct evidence that Qaani is a mole (although if so, we will never know for sure).
The complexity of orchestrating a high-profile assassination with such a specific target is difficult but not impossible, as has been demonstrated.
Khamenei's autonomy in choosing a successor was based on Qaani's experience and loyalty to the regime.
It is plausible that Israel and the US sought to eliminate Soleimani as an immediate threat, but under the umbrella of Soleimani's assassination and its significant impact on the Iranian regime, the true objective of the operation could be hidden: to place a high-level asset in a key position in the Iranian military hierarchy, with access to sensitive information.
The setbacks under Qaani could be an unintended consequence of his diminished charisma and strategic experience, combined with the aggressiveness of Israeli operations, but also the result of willful negligence and possession of privileged information, which allowed him to escape the elimination of Hezbollah's leadership and, subsequently, a wide range of leading figures in the Iranian military establishment.
These speculations about Qaani reflect the intensity of the shadow war between Israel and Iran, which has escalated since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Israeli bombings in Beirut and Tehran, combined with covert operations such as the tampering of electronic devices in Lebanon, have significantly weakened Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure, as well as its regional allies. Qaani's survival, real or not, and rumors about his loyalty are a reflection of internal mistrust in Iran and the effectiveness of Israeli psychological operations.
Within Iran, suspicions about Qaani could exacerbate tensions between IRGC factions and the government, especially in a context of economic crisis and growing external pressure. Regionally, the weakened position of Hezbollah and Hamas could force Iran to reevaluate its strategy, possibly turning to new leaders or tactics.
Esmail Qaani is a complex figure in the Iran-Israel conflict. Rumors about his collaboration with the Mossad, while intriguing, lack solid evidence and are likely part of a disinformation campaign aimed at destabilizing Iran. But the low mathematical probabilities of survival from the attacks in Beirut and Tehran (between 47.64% and 50.53%) raise reasonable doubts, despite his high mobility and the extensive security measures that surely surround him.
The theory that Soleimani's assassination was designed to facilitate Qaani's rise is highly speculative, I know, but we've seen stranger things with Israeli intelligence. Ultimately, Qaani remains an enigma, a phantom general, as some media outlets have described him, whose survival and decisions will continue to fuel debates in a context of growing geopolitical tension in the Middle East.